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 Analyzing Pricing Strategies for Online-Services with Network Effects 
 
Pang Min-Seok and Hila Etzion 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we model firms that sell a product and a complementary online service, where only the latter 
displays positive network effects. That is, the value each consumer derives from the service increases with 
the total number of consumers that subscribe to the service. In addition, the service is valuable only to 
consumers who buy the product. We consider two pricing strategies: 1) bundle pricing, in which the firm 
charges a single price for the product and the service; and 2) separate pricing, in which the firm sets the 
prices of the product and the service separately, and consumers self-select whether to buy both or only the 
product. We show that, in contrast to the common result in the bundling literature, often the monopolist 
chooses not to offer the bundle (he either sells the service separately or not at all) while bundling would 
increase consumer surplus and social welfare. Thus, under-provision of the service can be the market 
outcome.  We also demonstrate that network effects may cause the under-provision of the service. 
Keywords: Bundling, Network Effects, Price Discrimination, Online Services, Online Game Industry 
 
1. Introduction  
Advances in information and communication technologies, such as Web 2.0 and „Social Technologies‟ (Li 
and Bernoff 2008), enable firms to offer a variety of online services, such as blogs, peer-to-peer file 
sharing, social networking, and online gaming platforms, to their customers. Most of these online services 
promote relationship building and interactivity among the users, and thus exhibit positive network effects. 
That is, the value of the service to a user increases with the number of other consumers that subscribe to 
the service. Offering the service can increase a firm‟s revenue in two ways; it can generate direct revenue 
from service subscribers and, in addition, it can increase the demand for the firm‟s products. However, 
offering the service can be costly for the firm and thus not always profitable. In this paper, we model a 
firm that sells a product and can offer a complementary online service that displays positive network 
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effects. We analyze the firm‟s optimal provision and pricing of the online service and derive strategic and 
welfare implications.  
An example of a company that sells a product and offers a complementary online service is Ganz.  
Ganz released Webkinz, toy stuffed animals, on April 29 2005. The toys are similar to many other small 
plush toys (see an example in Figure 1); however, each Webkinz toy has an attached tag with a unique 
secret code printed on it that allows access to the Webkinz World website. On Webkinz World, the secret 
code allows the customer to own a virtual version of the pet (see Figure 2). The customer can then play 
games online, use KinzCash to buy virtual accessories for his virtual pet, and answer trivia questions to 
earn more KinzCash. Additional value is derived from interacting with other users of the Webkinz World 
website. A user can invite other kids‟ virtual pets to his online room, chat with them and play online 
games together. Thus, although the online service provides value to the customer even if no one else uses 
it, it often provides higher value when more kids do use it. In addition, the social site offers a more 
engaging experience than a mere stuffed animal does, thus allowing Ganz to charge a premium price for 
its stuffed animals (the price paid when buying the toy includes “free” access to Webkinz World online). 
In this example, the product and the online service are sold as a bundle, and a consumer who is interested 
only in a plush toy is less likely to become a customer due to the high price of the Webkinz plush toy. 
 
Figure 1. Webkinz beagle stuffed animal sold on Amazon for $18.95. 
The price includes the stuffed animal and access to Webkinz World 
website. 
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Figure 2. Webkinz World: each user has a virtual pet which looks like the 
stuffed animal purchased. The virtual pets can play with each other, visit 
each other’s room, chat etc. 
Another example of a company that sells products and also offers a complementary online service 
to its customers is Blizzard, a leader in the computer games industry. A consumer who buys a computer 
game from Blizzard can play the game offline in the single-player mode. Playing offline, the consumer 
plays pre-defined scenarios, programmed in the game package, against hypothetical competitors with 
artificial intelligence. However, if the consumer connects to Blizzard‟s online gaming platform, Battle.net, 
he can also play in the multi-player mode, playing in real-time against other remote human players. 
The set of pre-programmed game strategies included in the game package is narrower than the set of 
strategies that can be used by human players. Therefore, many Blizzard customers are willing to pay a 
premium in order to access the online service and play against remote human players. However, as is 
evident from several online forums, there are some consumers who prefer the simplicity and ease of 
playing alone in the single-play mode. Such consumers prefer to pay less and obtain only the basic game 
package.  
There are many examples of firms who facilitate the creation of online communities for consumers 
who buy their products. Online communities are a typical online service that displays strong network 
effects.  Dell, for example, successfully utilizes online communities in its business (Li and Bernoff 2008). 
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In Dell‟s online community
1
, Dell‟s customers can share technical information and knowledge that they 
learn while using Dell‟s products. Its online community not only saves Dell millions of dollars in 





 also operate online communities for users and developers of their products. Microsoft 
operates an online community, Zune Social
4
, where it‟s Zune MP3 player users can share music they 
purchase.  
In this paper, we examine a firm that sells a product and may offer a complementary online service to 
its customers. We assume that the cost of operating the service increases with the number of users and that 
the service exhibits positive network effects. In addition, we assume that the service has no value to 
consumers who do not buy the product. The firm can either bundle the service with the product and sell 
both for a single price
5
 or charge a separate service subscription fee, allowing some customers to pay a 
lower price to get only the product. The firm may also choose not to operate the service at all. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine a bundling decision when one of the two components 
displays network effects. 
We provide answers to the following research questions: 1) should the monopoly offer a bundle of 
product and service or sell the service separately?  2) are online services being over- or under-supplied by 
the monopoly compared to the socially optimal level?; and 3) does the fact that the service exhibits 
network effects affect the answers to the previous questions?  
 Both pricing strategies (bundling and selling the service separately) were observed in the online 
game industry in 2008. Blizzard Entertainment sold the games Starcraft and Diablo II each for $19.98. A 
customer could play these games either in the single-play mode, playing predefined scenarios, or in the 
multi-play mode, where he connects via the Internet to Battle.net and plays in real-time with other players 
                                            
1
 http://www.dell.com/community  
2
 For example, Oracle E-Business Suite Application Community - http://www.oracle.com/applications/community/e-
business-community.html 
3




 This is the same as offering the service “free of charge”, while increasing the price of the product. 
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from all over the world. The single payment included unlimited access to Battle.net. On the other hand, 
Blizzard sold the base package of World of Warcraft, which supports only the single play mode, for 
$36.99, and required players to pay a monthly subscription fee of $15 to play in the multi-play mode. In 
this paper, we examine when a firm should choose one strategy over the other and whether the strategy 
that maximizes the firm‟s profit also maximizes social welfare and consumer surplus.  
We show that as the cost of providing the service decreases, the degree of network effects increases, 
or the number of potential customers increases, the bundling strategy may dominate selling the service 
separately. It is interesting to note that in the absence of network effects, the size of the market would 
have no effect on the optimal selling strategy. However, because the service exhibits network effects, as 
the number of potential customers increases (perhaps due to advertisements or increased popularity of the 
product) the seller might find it profitable to stop selling the service separately and start bundling it with 
the product. In addition, we find that when considering online services with little or no inherent value (i.e., 
the value of the service to a user comes mainly from the participation of other users), the seller should 
never sell the service separately. Instead, he should offer the service bundled with the product if the cost 
of offering the service is below a threshold value, and should not offer the service otherwise. Thus, as the 
nature of online services changes so that they rely less on inherent functionalities and rely more on 
interactions between users, we should expect to see less services sold separately.   
Addressing our second research question, we show that the service may be supplied less than is 
socially optimal. Especially, we find that, under certain conditions, bundling is preferred by consumers 
and maximizes social welfare, but the monopoly chooses to sell the service separately. This result differs 
from the common findings reported in the bundling literature, according to which the monopoly uses 
bundling to extract surplus from consumers, who cannot benefit from bundling (Adams and Yellon 1976, 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999). We also show that in some cases it is optimal for the firm not to offer the 
service, but social welfare and consumer surplus would be maximized when the service is offered. We 
demonstrate that network effects can be the reason why the service is often under-provided compared to 
the socially optimal level.  
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The paper structure is as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In Section 3, we 
present our model and derive the optimal monopolist‟s strategy for different parameters values. In Section 
4 we discuss welfare implications, and in Section 5 we examine how network effects drive the results. We 
conclude in Section 6.  
2. Literature Review 
Our study is related to the literature on network effects and on bundling. Under-provision of a single 
product with network effects has been previously shown in the literature. However, most of the bundling 
literature shows that consumers are better off when the monopoly does not offer the bundle but sell the 
components separately (Schmalensee 1984, McAfee et al (1989), Bakos and Brynjolfsson 200). Thus, in 
our setup, which involves both network effects and a bundling decision, it is not clear which effect would 
be stronger; one might expect to see over-provision of the service rather than under-provision (i.e., the 
monopoly sells a bundle while selling the service separately maximizes social welfare) due to the fact that 
bundling is usually more beneficial to the firm than to consumers. The question is thus whether network 
effects can make consumers prefer bundling more than the firm. This paper shows that this is indeed so.  
2.1 Network Effects 
Network effects arise when the utility that a user derives from a product increases with the number of 
other consumers that use the same or compatible product (Katz and Shapiro 1985). Therefore, a 
customer's utility from a product that displays network effects is usually modeled as a function of the 
product's inherent value and of the number of customers using the product (Ellison and Fudenberg 2000). 
In addition, most models consider the network effects to be linear in the size of the user-base (Katz and 
Shapiro 1986, Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, Jing 2007).   
In the classic models of products with network effects, the value a consumer derives from the network 
is independent of the consumer type. Specifically, consumers have homogenous network valuations 
though they have heterogeneous product valuations (Cabral et al. 1999, Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, Jing 
2007). In more recent models, however, a multiplicative function is used in which the consumer type 
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determines both his product valuation and the benefit he obtains from the network (e.g., Ellison and 
Fudenberg 2000, Sundararajan 2003, Sundararajan 2004). In such models, a consumer with high (low) 
product valuation also has a high (low) marginal valuation for the network of product users. Following 
this recent approach, in our paper the consumer‟s type determines both his valuation for the inherent 
functionalities of the service and his valuation for the network of service users. 
A large number of studies on network goods examine product compatibility and standardization (e.g., 
Farrell and Saloner 1986, Katz and Shapiro 1985), technology adoption (e.g., Choi 1994, Katz and 
Shapiro 1986) and entry deterrence (Cabral et al. 1999, Fudenberg and Tirole 2000). The concept of 
Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium is often used in deriving the firm‟s optimal pricing strategy. In the 
presence of network effects, consumers purchasing decision is based on the expected network size, and 
under the Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium requirement the realized demand indeed equals the expected 
network size (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Palma et al. 1999, Sundararajan 2004.) 
The present paper contributes to the literature on network effects as it examines a monopolist‟s 
bundling decision when one of the components displays positive network effects. Specifically, we show 
that a service that displays positive network effects is often under-supplied by a monopoly. This finding is 
in accordance with arguments from the network externalities literature, according to which network goods 
may be adopted less than is socially optimum (Katz and Shapiro 1986, Farrell and Klemperer 2007). For 
example, Katz and Shapiro (1994) state that in the presence of network externalities, social marginal 
benefits from an increase of one unit in network size exceed private (i.e., the firm‟s) marginal benefits, 
and thus the equilibrium network size is smaller than the socially optimal network size. Farrell and 
Saloner (1985) suggest that excess inertia or excess momentum may be the explanation for inefficient 
adoptions of goods with network externalities. Sundararajan (2004) derives the monopolist‟s optimal 
nonlinear pricing strategy when consumers have heterogeneous network valuations and may purchase 
variable quantities of the good. He shows that the product might be under-supplied relative to the socially 
optimal level.  
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2.2 Bundling 
Our work also contributes to the bundling literature. The seminal paper by Adams and Yellon (1976) 
provides a two-good bundling model and examines three pricing strategies: pure components, pure 
bundling, and mixed bundling. In the mixed bundling strategy each individual component as well as the 
bundle are sold to consumers, and the bundle price is lower than the sum of the two components‟ prices. 
While Adams and Yellen (1979) consider negative correlation between the valuations for the two goods, 
McAfee et al. (1989) allow for positive correlation or independence of valuations. Schmalensee (1984) 
considers a case in which one of two products is provided competitively while the firm is the sole vendor 
of the other product. Schmalensee (1984) and McAfee et al. (1989) show that mixed bundling always 
dominates offering only a bundle, and examine under which conditions the mixed bundling strategy 
yields higher profit than the pure component strategy. Both show that, although in some cases the mixed 
bundling strategy is optimal for the monopolist, the pure component strategy always yields higher 
consumer surplus. 
Our model differs from those in the above papers in several ways. First, in our model one of the 
components, namely the service, has no value without the other, and thus consumers never subscribe to 
the service without buying the product; they either buy both or only the product. Therefore, in our setup, 
the seller needs to consider only two strategies when offering the service: pure bundling, forcing all 
customers who buy the product to also buy the service, or selling the two separately and thus allowing 
some consumers to buy only the product while others buy the product and the service. There is never a 
group of consumers that buys only the service and thus there is no difference between a strategy that sets 
two prices, one for the product and one for the service, and a strategy that sets a product price and a 
bundle price 
6
. Second, we assume that the valuations for the two goods (the product and the service) are 
independent of each other. Third, we assume that one of the two components, the service, displays 
network effects. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to consider a bundling decision in this 
                                            
6
 In our model, a strategy with price f for the service, p for the product and pb for a bundle of the two, where pb<p+f, 
is identical to a strategy with prices p for the product and (pb -p) for the service.  
 
 - 9 - 
context. Lastly, unlike in Adams and Yellen (1976), in our model, the seller cannot execute first-degree 
price discrimination.  
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) model a monopolist selling a large number of information goods and 
show that bundling enables the firm to capture most of the consumer surplus, as it reduces the variance in 
consumers' valuations and makes the demand more elastic. In their following study (Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson 2000), they introduce a positive marginal production cost and a distribution cost for 
delivering the bundle to each individual customer. They show that these two cost components play a key 
role in the monopolist‟s decision whether or not to bundle the goods. In our model, the marginal cost of 
providing the service has a similar effect to the production cost from Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000), i.e., 
the firm is more likely to offer a bundle of product and service if the marginal cost of the service 
decreases.   
The literature generally agrees that bundling enables a seller to capture more value from consumers 
and thus it reduces the consumer surplus (Schmalensee (1984), McAfee et al. (1989), Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson 2000). However, several studies find that, under certain unique conditions, both the 
consumers and the seller may benefit from bundling. For instance, Salinger (1995) suggests that if 
producing a bundle of two goods costs less than producing the two goods separately, both the producer 
and the consumers may benefit from bundling. Dansby and Conrad (1984) show that if the value of a 
bundle is superadditive, i.e. the value of a bundle is greater than the sum of the values of the individual 
goods, bundling may increase both the seller‟s profit and consumer surplus. 
Finally, Dewan and Freimer (2003) examine a monopolist who sells base software, such as an 
operating system, and an add-in, such as anti-virus software or Internet browser. The add-in has no value 
without the base software. In contrast to prior works, they show that often consumers prefer a bundle, 
while the monopoly chooses to sell the add-in separately. This result hangs on the assumption that some 
users incur a penalty when the add-in is bundled with the base software.  
Our model is similar to that in Dewan and Freimer because both models examine a monopoly‟s 
bundling decision when one of the two components (the add-in in Dewan and Freimer 2003, and the 
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online service in this paper) has no value without the other. Thus, the bundling problem is asymmetric. 
However, while in Dewan and Freimer (2003) both the base product and the add-in have zero marginal 
cost (both are information goods), in our model providing the service is costly for the firm. When more 
users register to the service, the firm has to invest in increasing communication capabilities, network 
capacity, and so on. In addition, in our model the component that has no value by itself displays network 
effects. Finally, unlike in Dewan and Freimer, in our model consumers never incur a penalty when the 
service is sold bundled with the product.   
Though our setting and focus differ from those in Dewan and Freimer (2003), we reach a similar 
result. Consumers often prefer the service to be bundled with the product, while the monopoly does not 
find this pricing strategy optimal. In our setup, the reason for this under-provision of the service is the 
presence of network effects.  
3. The Model 
We consider a monopoly that sells a product and can provide a complementary online service to 
consumers who buy the product. We assume that the product has zero marginal production cost (a 
common assumption for most information goods), while the cost of providing the service increases with 
the number of subscribers.  For instance, an online-game provider needs to operate a larger service system 
(e.g., servers, network facilities, and so forth) to serve a greater number of subscribers
7
. If the product has 
a positive marginal cost, then the model presented here still applies if consumers‟ valuations of the 
product are taken net of the marginal cost.  
There are N potential customers who are heterogeneous in terms of their valuations for the product 
and for the service. We assume that the valuation for the product, θ, is uniformly distributed on [0, 𝜃]. In 
addition, a consumer‟s valuation for the service is given by α(s+ns), where α represents the consumer type, 
ns is the total number of customers who subscribe to the service, and s is the intrinsic value of the service 
independent on the number of service users (for example, s can be the value of the product‟s 
                                            
7
 Blizzard reports that it invested more than $200 million in its service infrastructure for World of Warcraft online 
users.  
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functionalities which are activated only when a user subscribes to the service). This functional form is 
based on the assumption that a consumer who has a higher intrinsic value for the service also assigns 
more importance to the size of the network of service subscribes (Ellison and Fudenberg 2000). Here we 
assume that the value of the network increases linearly with the number of users. We discuss the case of 
concave network effects in Appendix 2.  
If all consumers have the same valuation for the service and for the network of service users, i.e. if all 
consumers have the same α, then the seller cannot segment the market. That is, the seller cannot set two 
prices, one for the product and one for the service, so that some consumers choose to get only the product 
while others choose to get both product and service. Even if the service is sold separately, the sum of the 
two prices would be the same as the price of a corresponding bundle, and the two strategies (bundling and 
selling the service separately) would yield the same profit. Given that we are interested in exploring when 
the seller should bundle the service with the product and when he should offer the service separately, we 
model consumers with heterogeneous network valuations. Our model thus differs from standard models 
of network effects in which consumers have homogenous network valuations (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 
1985) and resembles more recent models in which consumers may have different (marginal) valuations 
for the network (e.g., Sundararajan 2004). 
The heterogeneity in the valuations for the service is modeled as follows. To simplify the analysis, we 
divide customers into two groups: βN customers (Group 1) have α=α1, while the remaining (1-β)N 
customers (Group 2) have α=α2. We assume that 0 < β ≤ 1 and 𝛼1 > 𝛼2 ≥ 0, so that Group 1‟s customers 
have a higher valuation for the service and for the network.
8
 We assume that the vendor cannot identify a 
consumer‟s valuation for the product or for the service. We also assume that θ and α are independent, so 
that some consumers can have a low product valuation but a high service valuation, and vice versa. This 
latter assumption well represents reality in many cases. For example, some kids buy a Webkinz plush toy 
(the product) mainly in order to have a virtual pet to play with on Webkinz World online (the service) and 
                                            
8
 The main results presented in this paper still hold when there are m consumer groups with parameters 𝛼𝑖  , i=1,…,m 
where  𝛼𝑖 > 𝛼𝑖+1  for i=1, 2, …, m-1, and consumers from group i have service valuation  αi(s+ns). We discuss this 
extension in Appendix 2. 
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interact with other kids‟ virtual pets. They don‟t value the plush toy (i.e., they have low product valuation), 
but they do value the service and the social network. In contrast, younger kids, who cannot yet use a 
computer, might like the soft plush toy, but have little value for the related online service. Finally, the 
monopolist has to incur a marginal cost c to serve each service subscriber. Table 1 summarizes the 
notation used in the model. 
N The number of potential customers  
θ Consumers‟ valuation of the product, drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,𝜃 ]  
αi The marginal service/network valuation for Group i‟s consumers, where α1> α2≥0  
β The proportion of Group 1 consumers in the market  
α0 The average marginal service valuation  (i.e. βα1+(1-β)α2 )  
s The intrinsic value of the complementary service  
c The marginal cost for providing the service  
pN The product price when the service is not offered  
pB The bundle price   
pS The product price when the service is sold separately  
f The service subscription fee when the service is sold separately  
np Demand for the product  
nS Demand for the service (also the size of the network)  
πB Profit from selling a bundle  
πN Profit from selling only the product   
πS Profit when selling the service separately   
Table 1. Notation  
The monopoly has three options as follows. He can sell only the product; this is likely to be his choice 
when consumers do not value the service highly enough to justify its provision cost. Alternatively, he can 
choose to offer the product and the service as a bundle, in which case all customers that buy the product 
also gain access to the service. This strategy can also be executed by selling the product at a higher price, 
while offering “free” access to the service. Finally, he may sell the service separately, in which case there 
can be consumers who buy the product but do not subscribe to the service. Table 2 lists the consumers‟ 
utility and the seller‟s profit, as functions of prices, for each of these three strategies. 
In this section, we derive the monopolist‟s optimal strategy, which clearly depends on the parameters 
values. To do so, we first find the optimal prices for each of the three strategies listed in Table 2, and then 
compare the maximum profits from the three strategies. 
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Firm’s Strategy  Consumers’ Utility Firm’s Profit 
Sell only product u1=u2= θ –pN                     πN=np pN 
Sell a bundle u1=θ+α1(s+nS)-pB         u2=θ+α2(s+nS)-pB      πB=nS (pB -c) 
Sell service 
separately  
u1=θ+α1(s+nS)-pS -f      u2= θ –pS                     πS=np pS 
+nS (f -c) 
 
Table 2. The consumer’s utility and the monopolist’s profit.  Here, ui  is the utility of a Group 
i’s customer and is a function of his product valuation θ and his type αi.  The demand for the 
product and for the service, np and ns, are functions of the prices. 
 
      When the monopoly sells only the product it is easy to show that the profit function is concave in the 
product price, the profit maximizing price is 𝑝𝑁 = 𝜃 2  , and half of the consumers choose to buy the 
product. Next, we analyze the profit from selling a bundle of product and service. 
When the firm sells a bundle of product and service and the bundle price, pB, does not exceed 𝛼2(𝑠 +
𝑁), there is an equilibrium in which all consumers from both groups buy the bundle and thus ns=N.  The 
seller‟s profit is given by 𝜋𝐵 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑁(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐) and is linearly increasing in the bundle price. Thus, it is 
never optimal for the seller to set a bundle price lower than 𝛼2 (𝑠 + 𝑁). When the bundle price is such 
that 𝑝𝐵 > 𝛼2  𝑠 + 𝑁 , depending on the values of the parameters and the value of pB, different 
equilibriums may prevail.  
When the bundle price is such that  𝛼2  𝑠 + 𝑁 < 𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝1
9
, there is an equilibrium in which all 
consumers from Group 1 buy the bundle, but only some consumers from Group 2 (those with high 
product valuations) choose to buy the bundle. As the bundle price increases in this range, the demand 
from Group 2 decreases but the demand from Group 1 remains constant at βN.  In this range of prices, the 
seller‟s profit is given by 𝜋𝐵 𝑝𝐵 = (𝛽𝑁 + 𝑛𝑠2)(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐), where ns2 is the demand from Group 2 and is 
decreasing in the bundle price. When 𝑝1 < 𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝2 ,
10
 in equilibrium some consumers from Group 1 with 





  and is derived by solving the two equations, 𝑛𝑠2 =  1 − 𝛽 𝑁 (𝜃 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝛼2 𝑠 + 𝛽𝑁 +
𝑛𝑠2 )/𝜃 and 𝛼1 𝑠 + 𝛽𝑁 + 𝑛𝑠2 = 𝑝𝐵, for pB. The first equation is the condition for fulfilled expectation 
equilibrium demand from Group 2. The second equation states that a consumer from Group 1 with zero product 
valuation is indifferent if to buy the bundle or not. 
10
 𝑝2 = 𝜃 +
𝑠α2𝜃
𝜃−𝑀(α1−α2)𝛽
 , and is derived by solving  𝑛𝑠2 =  1 − 𝛽 𝑁 (𝜃 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝛼2 𝑠 + 𝑛𝑠2 + 𝑛𝑠2 )/𝜃 and 
𝑛𝑠1 = 𝛽𝑁 (𝜃 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝛼1 𝑠 + 𝑛𝑠2 + 𝑛𝑠1 )/𝜃  simultaneously, to find the fulfilled expectation demand from Group 2 
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low product valuations do not buy the bundle while there is still positive demand from Group 2. Here, the 
profit is given by 𝜋𝐵 𝑝𝐵 = (𝑛𝑠1 + 𝑛𝑠2)(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐), where nsi is the bundle demand from Group i, and is 
decreasing in the price. Finally, when 𝑝2 < 𝑝𝐵 <   𝜃 + 𝛼1𝑠 , there is an equilibrium in which consumers 
from Group 2 do not buy the bundle, i.e., ns2=0, and only some consumers from Group 1 buy the bundle.  
The profit from selling the bundle as described above is a continuous and concave function of the 
bundle price, pB. However, to have a non- empty range of pB values for which there is positive but partial 
demand from each group, we need to impose parameters conditions so that  𝛼2 𝑠 + 𝑁 < 𝑝1 < 𝑝2. Since 
we observe that for many bundles of product and service there is positive demand even from consumers 
who have low service valuation (consider the Webkinz example – some kids buy the plush toy and hardly 
use the Webkinz World website), and, in addition, we believe that often there are consumers with high 
service valuation who don‟t buy the bundle because their product valuation is too low, Assumption 1- (i) 
and (ii) follow. Specifically, conditions (i) and (ii) in Assumption 1 are necessary and sufficient for an 
equilibrium in which there is positive but partial demand from each group to prevail for a non-empty 
range of pB values. Finally, in this paper we focus on cases in which the profit from selling the bundle is 
maximized in the range 𝑝𝐵 > 𝑝1 (i.e., the profit function is increasing in pB at pB=p1). Thus, when the 
seller prices the bundle optimally, not all Group 1 consumers buy the bundle. The required condition on 
the parameters values for this to be the case is stated as Assumption 1 – (iii).  
Assumption 1.  i) 𝜃 > 𝛼0𝑁    
ii) 𝜃 > (𝛼
1
− 𝛼2)(𝑠 + 𝛽𝑁)  
iii)  𝑐 > −𝑠𝛼0 − 𝜃 +  
2(𝑁+𝑠)𝛼1𝜃
𝑁 𝛼1−𝛼2  1−𝛽 +𝜃
            
It is interesting to understand when Assumption 1 is likely to be satisfied. Conditions (i) and (ii) in 
Assumption 1 are satisfied as long as the upper bound on product valuations is reasonably high. 
Specifically, according to Assumption 1-(i) the highest product valuation,  𝜃 , should be larger than the 
average value of the network of service users when everyone uses the service. According to Assumption 
                                                                                                                                            
as a function of pB, and then solving  for the pB value at which this equilibrium demand  equals 0. 
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1-(ii) the highest product valuation should be larger than the difference between a Group 1‟s consumer 
service valuation and a Group 2‟s consumer service valuation when all Group 1 consumers use the service. 
Our paper thus examines services which complement a product with a reasonably large valuations range. 
In the case of a product that is never highly valued by consumers (compared to the service), the results 
would be different. Specifically, if Assumption 1-(ii) does not hold, then as the bundle price, pB, increases, 
the demand from Group 2 becomes zero before anyone from Group 1 finds it optimal not to buy the 
bundle. We believe that this situation rarely represents reality. Finally, the right hand side of Assumption 
1-(iii) is decreasing in 𝜃, (the RHS is concave in 𝜃, and the first derivative evaluated at 𝜃 = 0  is negative 
for any positive value of N).  Thus, again, as long as 𝜃 is reasonably large, this condition will be satisfied, 
and at the optimal bundle price not all Group 1‟s consumers buy the bundle.  
We next derive the optimal bundle price and resulting profit when the profit from selling the bundle is 
maximized when some consumers from Group 1 do not buy the bundle and there is positive demand from 
Group 2. Letting  𝑛𝑠1 and 𝑛𝑠2 denote the number of customers from Group 1 and Group 2, respectively, 
and e
sn  denote the total expected number of service users, we have : 








.   (1) 
Substituting from the above two equations in 𝑛𝑠
𝑒 = 𝑛𝑠1 + 𝑛𝑠2  and solving for 𝑛𝑠
𝑒 , we find the Fulfilled 
Expectations Equilibrium value of the demand, *





       (3) 
where          𝛼0 ≜ 𝛽𝛼1 +  1 − 𝛽 𝛼2 .     (4) 
The profit function is then given by  *B s Bn p c   , and the second-order condition is satisfied 
when 𝜃 > 𝛼0𝑁, which holds by Assumption 1-(i) . Using FOC, we find the optimal bundle price and  the 




 ,       (5) 






 .      (6) 
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When Assumption 1-(iii) holds, at the price given by Equation 5 not all consumers from Group 1 buy 
the bundle. In addition, when the bundle price is 𝑝𝐵
∗  as given in Equation 5, the demand from Group 2 is 
indeed positive only when c is lower than the following value:  
  𝑐𝐵 = 𝜃 + 𝑠  𝛼2  1 + 𝛽 +
2𝛽𝑁(𝛼1−𝛼2)
𝜃−𝛽𝑁(𝛼1−𝛼2)
 − 𝛼1𝛽  .    (7) 
If c> cB the seller would maximize the profit from selling the bundle only to Group 1 consumers and  




.  However, as is shown in the Proof of 
Proposition 1 (in Appendix 1), the profit from selling the service separately is higher than the profit from 
selling the bundle at price 𝑝𝐵
∗∗ so that only consumers from Group 1 buy it. Thus, this latter strategy will 
never prevail in equilibrium.  If c>cB, the seller would either sell the service separately or not sell it at all. 
Next we consider the strategy of selling the service separately.  If users from both groups subscribe to 
the service when the monopoly sells it separately, then there is no difference between the two strategies of 
selling the service separately and selling a bundle. Thus, when the monopoly sells the service separately, 
we maximize the profit gained when only customers from Group 1, who have higher valuation for the 
service, subscribe to the service. For this to be true, the two following incentive compatibility conditions 
should be met.                  𝛼1 𝑠 + 𝑛𝑠 ≥ 𝑓         (8) 
    𝛼2 𝑠 + 𝑛𝑠 + 1 𝑓         (9) 
Eq. 8 specifies the condition required so that no single Group 1‟s consumer who buys the product and the 
service has an incentive to unsubscribe from the service. Eq. 9 specifies the condition required so that a 
Group 2‟s customer has no incentive to deviate and subscribe to the service.  
The demand for the service as a function of prices and expected network size is given by: 




      (10) 
Substituting from the above equation in 𝑛𝑠
𝑒 = 𝑛𝑠1 and solving for
e
sn , we find the Fulfilled Expectations 
Equilibrium value of the demand, *





       (11) 
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The profit function is then given by  
 𝜋𝑠 =  𝑝𝑠 + 𝑓 − 𝑐 𝑛𝑠
∗ + 𝑁(1 − 𝛽)𝑝𝑠
𝜃−𝑝𝑠
𝜃  
,     (12) 
and the second-order condition is satisfied when 𝜃 > 𝛽𝛼1𝑁, which holds by Assumption 1-(i).  Using 





,                𝑓∗ =
𝑐+𝛼1𝑠
2
      (13) 
We also make the following assumption, which guarantees that if the service is sold separately at 
above prices, some Group 1 consumers do not buy the product and the service. 
Assumption 2.   𝑐 > 𝛼1(𝑠 + 2𝛽𝑁) − 𝜃 . 
Notice that as long as the upper bound on product valuations is sufficiently high, Assumption 2 would 
be satisfied. Table 3 summarizes the optimal prices and the resulting demand and profit for the three 
pricing strategies. 
Selling only the Product  
Profit 𝜋𝑁
∗ = 𝜃𝑁 4     
Product 
Price 
𝑝𝑁 = 𝜃 2   Demand 𝑛𝑝
∗ = 𝑁 2   
Selling the Bundle  (when c < cB) 
Profit    𝜋𝐵
∗ =
𝑁 𝜃 + 𝛼0𝑠 − 𝑐 
2
4 𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁 








𝑁 𝜃+𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  
2 𝜃−𝛼0𝑁 
  























𝛽 𝜃+𝛼1𝑠−𝑐  
 𝜃−𝛽𝛼 1𝑁 











𝛽𝑁 𝜃 + 𝛼1𝑠 − 𝑐  
2 𝜃 − 𝛽𝛼1𝑁 
 
Table 3. The optimal prices and the resulting demand and profit 
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Next, we present Proposition 1 which states the monopoly‟s optimal strategy. In Proposition 1, ci,j 
represents the value of c at which 𝜋𝑖
∗ > 𝜋𝑗
∗ if and only if c < ci,j (where the profit expressions, 𝜋𝑖
∗ and 𝜋𝑗
∗, 
are given in Table 3). 
Proposition 1. The monopoly optimal strategy.  
i) When 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠0 , the monopoly sells a bundle of product and service if and only if c<cB,N  and does not 
offer the service otherwise. 
ii) When 𝑠 > 𝑠0 , the monopoly sells a bundle if and only if c<cB,S, sells the service separately if and only 
if cB,S < c< cS,N,  and does not operate the service otherwise,  
where  
 𝑠0 =
 𝜃   𝜃 −𝛼1𝛽𝑁− 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
 𝛼1−𝛼2 (1−𝛽)
  ,         
 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 = 𝜃  1 −
 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁
 𝜃 
 + 𝛼0𝑠,           
  𝑐𝑆,𝑁 = 𝜃  1 −
 𝜃 −𝛼1𝛽𝑁
 𝜃 
 + 𝛼1𝑠; and 
 𝑐𝐵,𝑆 = 𝜃 −
𝛼2𝜃 𝑠−  𝜃 −𝛼1𝛽𝑁  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 (𝛽𝑠
2 𝛼1−𝛼2 
2+𝜃  𝜃 −𝛽𝑁 𝛼1−𝛼2  
𝜃 −𝛽𝑁(𝛼1−𝛼2)
 . 
Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are given in Appendix 1. 
Figure 3 describes the monopolist strategy choice according to Proposition 1.  
 
 s < s0 : most of the service’s value is due to network effects  
 
 
 s > s0 : the service has a significant intrinsic value  
  
             Figure 3. The monopoly’s optimal pricing strategy  
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An important insight from Proposition 1 is that when considering online services with little or no 
intrinsic value, i.e., 𝑠 < 𝑠0, the seller should never sell the service separately. Instead, he should offer the 
service bundled with the product (or offer the service “free of charge” but increase the price of the 
product) if the cost of offering the service is below cB,N. Notice that cB,N is always positive and is 
increasing in s. Thus as s increases (but is still below s0), the range in which the seller offers the bundle 
increases. Also, it is interesting to note that the threshold value, cB,N , is increasing in N, the size of the 
market. Thus, as the number of potential customers increases, the seller is more likely to offer the service. 
When the service displays network effects, there are economics of scale even if the marginal cost of 
offering the service is fixed. This would not be the case if the service did not exhibit network effects.  
When 𝑠 > 𝑠0, if the marginal cost of offering the service is lower than a threshold value given by cB,S, 
it is optimal for the vendor to charge customers a single price for the product and its complementary 
service. If the marginal cost is between cB,S and cS,N, the monopolist should sell the service separately, and 
if the marginal cost is higher than cS,N, the service should  not be offered. When 𝑠 > 𝑠0 , there is always a 
range of c values for which it is optimal for the seller to sell the service separately, though his range 
decreases as s approaches s0. Thus, as the nature of online services changes so that they rely less on 
inherent functionalities and rely more on the value created from network effects, we should expect to see 
less services sold separately.  
According to Proposition 1, the intrinsic value of the service, s, has to reach a threshold value for 
separate pricing to be chosen by the monopoly. This finding is consistent with the literature on price 
discrimination (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Deneckere and McAfee 1996). Specifically, only when the two 
consumer groups are differentiated enough in their service valuations (the difference between the 
valuations is a function of  𝑠(𝛼1 − 𝛼2) and is thus increasing in s), the monopoly chooses to use second-
degree price discrimination where consumers self-select what to buy, both product and service or only the 
product.  
In addition, according to Proposition 1, as the marginal cost of service, c, increases, the separate 
pricing strategy might outperform the bundling strategy. This finding is consistent with a real-life example. 
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According to a 2004 survey, users of Starcraft, Warcraft III, and Diablo II, spent on average 10.5 minutes 
a day in Battle.net, Blizzard‟s online gaming system; for all three games, online access was bundled with 
the game package
11
. On the other hand, the average playing-time per day of a user of World of Warcraft, 
was 3.24 hours
12
. This shows that Blizzard has to incur a higher cost to serve a World of Warcraft player 
than to serve a player of Starcraft, Warcraft III, or Diablio II. As predicted by our model, access to the 
online platform of World of Warcraft was sold separately from the game package. 
While in 2008 access to the online gaming platform of World of Warcraft was offered for a separate 
subscription fee, as of 2010 access to the online multi-player platform of World of Warcraft is offered free 
of charge to those who purchase the game package. That is, the seller switched from selling the service 
separately to selling a bundle. According to Proposition 1, the reason can be a decrease in the marginal 
cost of providing the service, c, or a decrease in the inherent value of the service, s. Another reason may 
be an increase in the size of the market. Notice that s0 is increasing in N, the potential number of 
customers. Thus if the potential market increases, it might be profitable for the seller to switch from 
selling the service separately to selling it bundled with the product, even if c and s have not changed. In 
contrast, an increase in the market size will have no effect on the optimal selling strategy when there are 
no network effects.  
4. Social Welfare  
In this section we examine how the monopolist‟s choice affects social welfare and consumer surplus. We 
provide two typical numerical examples, presented in Figure 4.a and 4.b, which demonstrate that the 
complementary service may be supplied less than is socially optimal. Table 4 provides a legend for the 
different regions in Figures 4.a and 4.b, and summarizes the different cases that can prevail in the market 
in terms of the strategy that maximizes the seller‟s profit and the strategy that maximizes social welfare. 
 
                                            
11
  http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/Blizzard_v_bnetd/20040930BNETDOrder.pdf. According to this article (page 4), 
as of September 2004, the number of active users is approximately 12 million, and they spend more than 2.1 million 
hours a day. By dividing 2.1 million hours by 12 million, we get 10.5 minutes.  
12
 http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/001365.php. This page reports that on average, a player spends 22.7 
hours per week, equivalent to 3.24 hours per day. 
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Region Monopoly’s Choice Social Surplus maximized with: Inefficiency 
1 Bundle Bundle N/A 
2 Separate Bundle Under-provision 
3 Separate Separate N/A 
4 No Service Bundle Under-provision 
5 No Service Separate Under-provision 
6 No Service No Service N/A 
           Table 4. Comparison of the profit’s and the Social Surplus’ maximizing strategies  
 
Figure 4(a). The monopoly’s profit maximizing strategy vs. the 
strategy that maximizes social welfare, for β=0.6 
 
 
Figure 4(b). The monopoly’s profit maximizing strategy vs. the 
strategy that maximizes social welfare for β=0.9 
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Figure 4.a and 4.b display the strategy that maximizes the monopoly‟s profit and the strategy that 
maximizes social welfare for different values of the marginal cost (c) and the intrinsic value of the service 
(s) for two possible sets of parameter values. The range of c-s values for each figure was determined so 
that the conditions stated in Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Notice that s0 from Proposition 1 
corresponds to the value of s at point b in Figures 4.a and 4.b. In addition, the curves a-b, b-c, and b-d in 
the two figures correspond to the thresholds cB,N, cB,S, and cS,N  from Proposition 1, respectively. 
Most of the bundling literature shows that bundling enables the monopoly to extract higher surplus 
from the consumers (e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999, 2000). In contrast, our finding of Region 2 in 
Figures 4.a and 4.b  in which the monopolist sells the service separately, but a bundle is socially optimal 
(which implies that consumer surplus is maximized with a bundle), is similar to the main finding from 
Dewan and Freimer (2003).  They examine a monopolist that sells a base product and an add-in. As in our 
model, the monopoly can either bundle the two or sell the add-in separately allowing some consumers to 
buy only the base product. In their model there are no network effects, and both products have zero 
marginal cost. The main result in Dewan and Freimer (2003), that the monopolist might sell the add-in 
separately while consumers prefer a bundle, is driven by the existence of a group of consumers that incur 
a penalty when they are forced to buy the add-in bundled with the base product. We show that network 
effects can be another reason that makes consumers prefer bundling more than the monopoly, causing 
under-provision. The intuition behind this result is as follows. If the service is only available in a bundle 
with the product, then more people buy it compared to when the service is sold separately from the 
product. Clearly, the utility to customers from the service is higher in the bundling case because of the 
positive network effects. On the other hand, bundling reduces the firm‟s revenue per Group 1‟s customer 
(pB< pS+f). Hence, due to the monopolist‟s profit maximization incentive, it may sometimes choose to sell 
the service separately instead of selling a bundle, reducing the social welfare. When the service does not 
exhibit network effects, the fact that more consumers buy the service when it is sold bundled with the 
product does not increase social welfare. Thus, when there are no network effects, it is less likely that 
bundling would maximize social welfare when the monopoly chooses to sell the service separately. 
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The cases presented in Regions 4 and 5 in Figures 4.a and 4.b are not reported in Dewan and Freimer 
(2003). In their paper, the add-in has no marginal cost and thus it is always being offered, either bundled 
with the base product or separately. In our model, on the other hand, there is a cost for providing the 
service which increases with the number of subscribers. If the cost is high enough, the vendor may choose 
not to provide the service. Thus, in some cases the monopoly does not offer the service while it is socially 
optimal to offer the service either in a bundle or separately. Proposition 2 states that there is always a 
range of marginal costs (c values) for which this latter type of under-provision of service would be 
observed. 
Proposition 2.   
i) When s<s0, there exists a none-empty range of c values in which the service is under-provided. 
Specifically, the monopoly does not offer the service, but a bundle would increase consumer 
surplus and social surplus.  
ii)  When s>s0, there exists a none-empty range of c values in which the service is under-provided. 
Specifically, the monopoly does not offer the service, but offering the service separately would 
increase consumer surplus and social welfare.  
Notice that in case (ii) of Propsition 2, we do not argue that selling  the service separately  maximizes 
social welfare or consumer surplus. It might be that selling a bundle maximizes social welfare. However, 
regardless, the seller does not offer the service, and thus the service is under-provided.   
While clearly under-provision of the service is feasible (Regions 2, 4, and 5 in Figures 4.a and 4.b), 
we could not find any numerical examples in which the service is over-provided compared to the socially 
optimal level
13
. Numerical investigation was necessary because the inequalites that need to be satisfied for 
over-provision of service to be the market outcome are too complex to analtyically verify whether they 
can all be met simultenously.  
                                            
13
 By comparing social welfare from the startegy that maximizes the seller‟s profit to the social welfare from other 
strategies, we searched for cases in which sevice is over-supplied. We searched over the following range of 
parameter valeus: β in [0, 1] in increments of  0.1; N  in  [0, 10000] in increments of  500; α1 in [0, 1], with 
increments of 0.05; α2 in [0 , α1]  in increments of  0.05; 𝜃  in [α0N, 10000] with increments of 100; s in [0, 20000] in 
increments of  500. 
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5. Network Effects and the Under-Provision of the Service  
Under-provision of the service can be a result of the monopoly‟s incentive to price-discriminate. In such 
cases, the monopoly chooses to sell the service separately and price it so that only customers who value it 
highly, i.e., only Group 1‟s customers, buy it; however, consumer surplus and social welfare would be 
higher if the service was sold to consumers from both groups (i.e., bundled with the product). Under-
provision of service can also happen when the seller chooses not to offer the service while social welfare 
would be higher if the service was offered, either bundled with the product or sold separately. 
In this section we examine the relationship between the existence of network effects and the fact that 
under-provision of service prevails. To do so, we focus on two special cases. 
1. The case in which consumers are homogeneous in terms of their service valuation, so that price 
discrimination cannot be the cause of under-provision of the service. Here, we compare the model 
in which the service displays network effects to a model without network effects, showing that 
the service can be under-provided in the former, but this does not happen in the latter.  
2. The case in which the service has no inherent value, so that the value derived by service users 
relies solely on interactions with other users. Here, we show that, under some general conditions, 
an increase in consumer surplus caused by a decrease in the marginal cost of the service or by an 
increase in the degree of network effects cannot be fully captured by the monopoly. This can 
explain the under-provision of the service.   
5.1 Homogenous Service Valuations 
When consumers have homogeneous service valuations, given by α(s+ns), the seller either sells the 
service to everyone that buys the product (sells a bundle) or does not offer the service. When the 








/8 .      (14) 
When the monopolist sells a bundle, his profit and consumer surplus are given by   
 









 .     (15) 
Because 𝜋𝐵
∗ + 𝐶𝑆𝐵
∗  is decreasing in c, while 𝜋𝑁
∗ + 𝐶𝑆𝑁




∗  if and only 
if 𝑐 > 𝑑𝐵,𝑁, where 
𝑑𝐵,𝑁 = 𝜃  1 −
 𝜃−𝛼𝑁  3
 3𝜃−2𝛼𝑁
 + 𝛼𝑠 .      (17) 
In addition, 𝜋𝐵
∗ < 𝜋𝑁
∗  if and only if 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐵,𝑁, where 
𝑐𝐵,𝑁 = 𝜃  1 −  𝜃 − 𝛼𝑁 + 𝛼𝑠       (18) 
Thus, the monopoly does not sell the service although the service would increase social welfare when cB,N 
<c<dB,N. Finally it can be shown that there is always a range of c values in which the service is under-
provided. Specifically:  
𝑑𝐵,𝑁 −  𝑐𝐵,𝑁 = 𝜃 𝜃 − 𝛼𝑁  1 −
 3𝜃−3𝑁𝛼
 3𝜃−2𝑁𝛼
 > 0,     (19) 




Figure 5 demonstrates this result. For c < cB,N, the monopoly offers a bundle of service and product, 
and this strategy also maximizes social welfare. For cB,N <c< dB,N, the monopoly does not offer the service, 
although social welfare and consumer surplus would be maximized with a bundle, and for c>dB,N, the 
monopoly does not offer the service, a choice which also maximizes social welfare. 
 
Figure 5. The under-provision of the service when consumers have homogenous service valuation,  
 
We now analyze an alternative model in which the complementary service does not display network 
effects. In this model, the utility from the service is αs and it does not depend on the number of service 
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subscribers. In this case, the monopoly‟s optimal strategy is to offer the bundle at a price of (𝜃+ c + αs)/2
 
when c < αs and does not offer the service otherwise, a decision which is socially optimal. Thus, when the 
service does not display network effects, there is no under-provision of the service. 
We note that although there is no under-provision of service in the setting with no network effects, the 
range of c values where the service is provided is smaller in this case (i.e., cB,N > αs). The reason is that if 
we hold s fixed, the total value of the service to consumers is lower in the case with no network effects. 
5.2  Social Networking  Services 
Here we consider the case in which the service has no inherent value, i.e. s =0, and consumers use the 
service for the mere purpose of social networking and interaction with peers. According to Proposition 1, 
when s = 0 the seller‟s optimal strategy is to sell a bundle if the cost of providing the service is 
sufficiently low, and he would never find it optimal to sell the service separately. The following Lemma 
gives additional insights as to why such services may be supplied less than is socially optimal  
Lemma 1.  When 𝜃 > 𝑐 : 
i) If 𝛼0>𝜃 /(2N)  then a decrease in the marginal cost of the service, c, has a larger positive effect on 
consumer surplus from a bundle than on the monopolist’s profit  from selling a bundle  
ii)  An incremental increase in α1 and α2 has a larger positive effect on consumer surplus from a 
bundle than on the monopolist’s profit from selling a bundle 
iii) If 𝛼0>𝜃 /(3N) then an increase in the market size, N, has a larger positive effect on consumer 
surplus from a bundle than on the monopolist’s  profit  from selling a bundle  
Lemma 1 explains why there is always a range of parameter values for which the monopoly chooses 
not to offer the service while consumer surplus is maximized when the seller offers a bundle (See 
Proposition 2). Technological developments can cause a reduction in the operating cost of the service (c) 
or enable the vendor to offer a service that provides greater degree of network effects (α). According to 
Proposition 1, as c decreases or as α1 and α2  both increase, consumer surplus from a bundle may exceed 
their surplus from only the product (the latter is constant in c and in α ) before the vendor's profit from 
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offering the bundle exceeds his profit from selling only the product. This result explains the under-
provision of service as stated in Proposition 2-(i). Notice that 𝛼0>𝜃 /(2N) is a sufficient condition which 
holds when α0 or N are large enough. Interestingly, an increase in either of these values represents an 
increase in the degree of network effects.   
6. Conclusion  
As online services proliferate and become strategically important for firms, it is important for researchers 
to investigate how firms should manage the offerings of such services. In this paper we provide an 
economic model and examine whether firms should bundle online services with their products or sell 
them separately, and whether the firm‟s choice maximizes social welfare. 
We show that as the cost of providing the service decreases or the number of potential customers 
increases, the bundling strategy may dominate selling the service separately. In addition, we find that 
when considering online services with little or no inherent value (the value of the service to a user comes 
mainly from the participation of other users), the seller should never sell the service separately. Instead, 
he should offer the service bundled with the product if the cost of offering the service is below a threshold 
value. Thus, as the nature of online services changes so that they rely less on inherent functionalities and 
more on network effects, we should expect to see less services sold separately.   
We show that often consumer surplus is maximized by a bundle of product and service, but the 
monopoly chooses to sell the service separately or not at all. This finding is in contrast to common 
contentions in the bundling literature, according to which bundling allows the monopoly to extract more 
consumer surplus, but it is consistent with previous work showing that a product with network effects 
maybe under-supplied. Thus, our paper shows that network effects can cause consumers to prefer 
bundling more than the firm. In addition, we show that as technology progresses, lowering the cost of the 
service and increasing the value of the service and its network, the adoption of online services by firms 
may lag behind the socially optimal level. Our findings imply that social planners or policy makers may 
have to provide the monopolist with incentives to offer online services. 
 
 - 28 - 
We examined the robustness of the results to several model assumptions; specifically: the number of 
consumer types, the linearity of network effects and the fact that a consumer‟s product valuations is 
independent of his service and network valuations. We find that our results robust to these assumptions. 
The analysis is presented in Appendix 2.  
An interesting extension to the present work would be to examine the duopoly case, where firms sell 
differentiated products and each firm may offer a complementary service to its customers. Our initial 
results show that in a duopoly, both under- provision and over-provision of the service can prevail. In 
addition, firms may be caught in a Prisoner‟s Dilemma, choosing to offer the service while not offering it 
would increase the industry‟s profit. 
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Appendix 1. Analytical Proofs  
Lemma 2.  (The results of Lemma 2 are used in the proof of Proposition 1) 
The proof of Lemma 2 follows the proof of Proposiiton 1 
Let ci,j denote the value of c at which πi*>πj* if and only if c < ci,j , where the profit expressions are given 









 if Bc c  
(ii) 
,S N Sc c  
(iii) 
,B S Bc c  
(iv) 
,S B Sc c  
(v) 𝑐𝑠 < 𝑐𝐸  and S Bc c  
Proof of Proposition 1 
For each of the three strategies, the optimal prices and the resulting profit and demand are given in Table 
3. For the case in which the monopoly sells the service separately, Table 3 lists the results of solving the 
unconstrained maximization problem (maximizing the profit without considering the constraints given by 
Eqs. 8 and 9 in the paper). We will show that if the prices and demand derived by solving the 
unconstrained problem do not satisfy the conditions given by Equations 8 and 9, then the strategy of 
selling the service separately at a price so that only customers from Group 1 buy it, is anyway not optimal. 
The optimal prices and resulting demand listed in Table 3 for selling the service separately satisfy the 
incentive compatibility constraints given in Equations 8 and 9 (that is  * *1 ss n f    and 
 * *2 1ss n f    ) only when S Sc c c  14, where  
                                            
14
 The range boundaries, 
Sc  and Sc , are derived by solving for the c values at which Eq. 8 and Eq. 9 are binding 
after substituting prices and demand from Table 3.  
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    
 




 , and     (A1) 
 1Sc N s    .        (A2) 
In addition, the optimal bundle price, and the resulting demand and profit expressions, given in Table 
3 for selling a bundle were derived assuming positive demand from Group 2 are thus valid only when 












    
   
  
           
.     (A3)  
When Bc c , if the bundle price is pB
*
 from Table 3, Group 2‟s consumers will not buy the bundle. 
We first show that selling the service separately, at a price so that only Group 1‟s customers buy it, is 




 ) according to 
Table 3, customers from Group 1 would not subscribe to the service. In this range of c values, the profit 
from selling the service only to Group 1 customers can be derived by solving the constrained 
maximization problem (maximizing the profit πS=np pS+ ns (f -c) subject to  1 ( , )s Ss n p f f   ), and 
this profit is clearly lower than the value given by *
S  in Table 3 (the solution of the unconstrained 
problem). Since 
* * ( )N S Sc c    (See Lemma 2-(ii), showing that ,S N Sc c ), 
*
N  is constant in c, and 
*
S  
is decreasing in c, we conclude that for c values such that Sc c , not selling the service yields higher 




S (unconstrained problem) >
*
S (constrained problem) when Sc c . 
When 




) according to Table 3, Group 2 customers 
would subscribe to the service. In this range of c values, the profit from selling the service separately at a 
price so that only consumers from Group 1 buy it, derived by solving the constrained maximization 
 
 - 32 - 
problem (maximizing the profit πS=np pS+ns(f -c), subject to  2 ( , ) 1s Ss n p f f    ), is lower than the 
value given by *
S  in Table 3. Since
* *( ) ( )B S S Sc c  (see Lemma 2-(iv) showing that ,S B Sc c ), both 
expressions are decreasing in c but *
B  is decreasing faster than 
*
S  when Bc c   (see Lemma 1-(i)), and 
S Bc c  (see Lemma 1-(v)), we conclude that for c values such that Sc c , selling a bundle to both 
groups yields higher profit than selling the service separately at a price so that only consumers from 
Group 1 buy it. Specifically, we have shown that 𝜋𝐵
∗ > *




Sc c  .  
Thus, selling the service separately so that only customers from Group 1 buy it might be optimal only 
for some c values such that S Sc c c   (if this range is not empty). Outside this range, we need only 
consider the profit from selling only the product, which is constant in c, and the profit from selling a 
bundle, which is decreasing in c.   
Next, we show that selling a bundle only to Group 1 consumers (i.e., the bundle price is too high for 
any Group 2 consumers to buy it) can never be optimal. When 𝑐 < 𝑐𝐵  ,if the monopoly sells a bundle then 
the optimal bundle price is given by pB
*
 , and there is positive demand from both groups. When 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐵 , if 
the bundle price is pB
*
 from Table 3, Group 2 consumers will not buy the bundle
15
. In this range of c 
values, at price pB
*
 the seller can sell the bundle only to Group 1 consumers. However, selling the bundle 
only to Group 1, the optimal bundle price would be pB
**
=  1 / 2s c   , which is larger than pB*. Thus, 
when 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐵  the profit from selling a bundle at price pB
**







(c ) (the RHS is the profit from selling a bundle at price pB
**
) at a c value 
smaller than 𝑐𝐵, denoted by cE.  In addition, the strategy of selling a bundle only to Group 1 consumers at 
price pB
**
 is feasible only for c > c0; for lower c values some Group 2 consumers will buy the bundle at 




 clearly 𝑐0 < 𝑐𝐵 . Figure A1 demonstrates the profit from selling the 
                                            
15
 Since Group 1 has a higher value for the service than Group 2, when the bundle price is pB*, the demand from 
Group 1 becomes zero at a value of c greater than 𝑐𝐵  
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bundle at price pB
*  











Figure A1. Profit from selling the bundle to both groups vs. profit from 
selling it only to Group 1 
 
Next we show that the strategy of selling the bundle at price pB
**
, so that only consumers from Group 
1 buy it, can never be optimal.  
 When c is such that S Sc c c  , selling the service separately so that only consumers from Group 
1 buy it (and consumers from Group 2 buy only the product) would yield larger profit than selling 






). This is because the profit from Group 1 
stays the same (under both strategies, Group 1 customers buy both product and service for total 
price of  1 / 2s c   ), but when service is sold separately, the monopoly generates additional 
profit from sales of the product to Group 2.  
 When Sc c , the profit from not offering the service, 
*
N , is larger than the expression given by 
*
S  (see Lemma 1-(ii) showing ,S N Sc c ) and thus it is clearly larger than the profit from selling 
the bundle only to Group 1 at price pB
**
.  That is, in this range *
N >
*
S  > 𝜋𝐵
∗∗. 
 When 
Sc c , since c < cE  (see Lemma 1-(v) showing 𝑐𝑠 < 𝑐𝐸), selling the bundle to both groups 
for price pB
*
 as listed in Table 3 dominates selling the bundle only to Group 1 . 
*
B  - Profit from selling a bundle at price 
*
Bp  




 - profit from selling a bundle at price pB
**
 so 
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    To summarize, when 
Sc c or Sc c , we should consider selling a bundle to both groups with profit 
*
B , or not selling service at all with profit
*
N . For S Sc c c  , all three strategies listed in Table 3 should 
be considered. We also note that *
N  is constant in c, while 
*
B  and 
*
S  are monotonically decreasing in c 
in the range of c values where the corresponding strategy is feasible. In addition, *
B  decreases in c faster 
than *
S  when Bc c  (see Lemma 1-(i)). Thus, 
1) Each pair of functions out of the three ( *
N ,
*
B , and 
*
S ) might intersect at most once at the range 
where the relative strategies are feasible. 
2) If *
B  and 
*
S  do intersect at c value smaller than Bc , then 
* *
B S   only to the left of the 
intersection 
To determine the optimal strategy for each c value, we next find the following values: 
- cB,S : the c value at which 
* *
B S   
- cB,N : the c value at which 
* *
B N   
- cS,N : the c value at which 
* *
S N   
The three thresholds are given by 
 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 = 𝜃  1 −
 𝜃−𝛼0𝑁
 𝜃
 + 𝛼0𝑠   
𝑐𝑆,𝑁 = 𝜃 1 −
 𝜃−𝛼1𝛽𝑁
 𝜃
 + 𝛼1𝑠 , and  
𝑐𝐵,𝑆 = 𝜃 −
𝛼2𝜃 𝑠−  𝜃 −𝛼1𝛽𝑁  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 (𝛽𝑠
2 𝛼1−𝛼2 
2+𝜃  𝜃 −𝛽𝑁 𝛼1−𝛼2  
𝜃 −𝛽𝑁(𝛼1−𝛼2)
. 
Notice that , 0B Nc   and , 0S Nc  , and thus for low values of c, the service is always offered. In addition, 
Lemma 2 shows that ,S N Sc c , ,B S Bc c , and ,S B Sc c .Therefore, if the separate pricing is optimal in 
some range of c values, it must be that the bundling pricing is optimal for 
,B Sc c , the separate pricing is 
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optimal for 
, ,B S S Nc c c  , and selling only the product is optimal for ,S Nc c . 
Next, we show that 
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N N
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When 0s s  we have:   
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         
     
        
    
     
 




,( )N B B Nc c 
   (A5) 
Since 
* * *
, ,( ) ( )S B N N B B Nc c c c      , it must be that  , , ,S N B N B Sc c c  . More specifically, when 0s s ,  
(i) * * *
B S N     if ,S Nc c , 
(ii) * * *




N B S     if , ,B N B Sc c c  , and 
(iv) * * *
N S B     if ,B Sc c . 
In addition, as shown in Lemma 2-(iii),
,B S Bc c , and thus , ,B N B S Bc c c   and selling a bundle at price 
pB
*
 so that both groups buy it is feasible for all c value to the left of cB,N. To summarize, when 0s s , the 
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monopoly chooses to sell a bundle when 
,0 B Nc c  , and does not sell the service otherwise. Figure A2 
demonstrates this case. 
 
Figure A2. Profit from the different strategies as function of the marginal cost of service 
when s < s0 for 1 2( 4000, 0.015, 0.005, 200, 0.6, 0)N s          
 
When s > s0 we have 
* * *
, ,( ) ( )S B N N B B Nc c c c       
and therefore
, ,B N S Nc c . Thus, when 0s s , it must 
be that 
, , ,B S B N S Nc c c  . More specifically, when 0s s : 
(i) * * *
B S N     if ,B Sc c , 
(ii) * * *
S B N     if , ,B S B Nc c c  ,  
(iii) * * *
S N B     if , ,B N S Nc c c  , 
(iv) * * *
N S B     if ,S Nc c .  
In addition, from Lemma 2,
,S B Sc c , ,B S Bc c , and ,S N Sc c , so that , , ,S B S B N S N Sc c c c c    . We 
conclude that when 0s s , bundling is optimal for ,B Sc c , selling the service separately is optimal for 
, ,B S S Nc c c   (this range is not empty), and not offering the service is optimal for ,S Nc c . Notice that if 
, 0B Sc   then the bundle pricing is never optimal. Figure A3 demonstrate a typical case when 0s s . 
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     Figure A3. Profit from the different strategies as function of the marginal cost of service  
when s > s0, for 1 2
( 4000, 0.015, 0.005, 200, 0.6, 5000)N s          
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
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 
 
 .       (A7) 
When Assumption 1 holds we have: 
 1 2 0
2
1 2 1 2
( )
0





     

       
  
         









 when Bc c  .      
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(ii) Here we show that 










             (A9) 
In addition, *
S  is decreasing in c and 
*
N  is a constant in c. Thus, 
*
S  equals 
*
N  at a value of c that is 
smaller than Sc . That is, ,S N Sc c  
(iii) Here we show that 
,B S Bc c  .  We have: 







(1 ) (1 )( )
0
4
S B B B
N N s
c c c c
N
        
 
  
    
    

   
The last inequality holds under Assumption 1. Therefore,    * *S B B Bc c c c    and in addition, as 
c decreases *
B  increases to a greater extent than
*
S  (see Lemma 2-(i)). This shows that 
*
S  equals to 
*
B  at a value of c smaller than 𝑐𝐵  , i.e., ,B S Bc c .   
(iv)   Here we show that
,S B Sc c .  The difference between the two values is given by: 
  










N s N s N
  
   





          
      
 
We will show that under Assumptions 1 this difference is positive.  
According to Assumptions 1, the following three inequalities hold: 
 1 0 0N N                (A11) 
  1 2 0 0N N          , and      (A12) 
 22 0            (A13) 
The latter inequality holds because by Assumption 1 and the fact that N >2 (or else there is no 
network effect) we have  1 22 (1 ) 0       , and  1 2 22 (1 ) 2       because 1 2  . 
(A10) 
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From inequalities A11 and A12 it is clear that the first term in A10 is positive. 
Next we show that the second term in A10 is positive, i.e., we show that: 
          221 2 1 2 0 1 2 1 22N s N s N                           
 
>0 
From Equation (A13) we have: 
  2 1 22 0s       ,  and       (A14) 
from Equation (A12) we have: 
     22 1 2 1 2 0s N            .      (A15) 
In addition, we have: 
       
        
2
2 22
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
22
1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2
(1 ) 4 2 2 0
s s N
s s N
           
             
 
        
 
          
 (A16) 




>0 and (a+b) >0 then (a-b)>0.  Thus, Equations A14, 
A15 and A16 show that: 
       222 1 2 1 2 1 22 0s s N                    .    (A17) 
Finally, from A11 and A17 we conclude that  
            221 2 1 2 0 1 2 1 22 0N s N s N                            (A18) 
Thus, , 0B S Sc c  . 
(v)  Here we show that 𝑐𝑠 < 𝑐𝐸  and S Bc c  .  






        (A19) 
It can be easily shown that 
 






< 0.       (A20) 




 which is constant in c. This implies that if cE 
denotes to the c value at which 𝜋𝐵
∗∗ = 𝜋𝐵
∗ , and thus  𝜋𝐵
∗∗ < 𝜋𝐵
∗  for c< cE , then cE >cB,S, and by Lemma 
2-(iv), 
 𝑐𝑠 < 𝑐𝐵,𝑆 < 𝑐𝐸          (A21) 
In addition, because 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑐𝐵  we get S Bc c . 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The profit from selling a bundle and the profit from selling only the product are given in Table 3. 






.         (A22) 
When the monopoly sells the bundle, the utility of a Group j‟ consumer is given by 
𝑢𝑗
∗ = 𝜃 + 𝛼𝑗  𝑛𝑠
∗ + 𝑠 − 𝑝𝐵
∗ = 𝜃 + 𝛼𝑗  
𝑁 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐 




   (A23) 
From 𝑢𝑗





− 𝛼𝑗  
𝑁 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐 
2 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
+ 𝑠       (A24) 
=
2 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝜃 +𝑠 𝛼0−𝛼𝑗   − 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼𝑗   
2 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
 . 










  𝜃 + 𝛼1  
𝑁 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐 







∗  ,  (A25) 










  𝜃 + 𝛼2  
𝑁 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐 







∗ .  (A26) 
Thus, when the monopoly sells the bundle at the profit maximizing bundle price, total consumer surplus is 
given by 
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𝐶𝑆𝐵
∗ =
𝛽𝑁  𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼1  
2
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 +
(1−𝛽)𝑁  𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼2  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼2  
2
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2    




∗ , and by 
𝑐𝐵,𝑁 the solution (c value) of 𝜋𝐵
∗ = 𝜋𝑁
∗ . However, after deriving the general expressions for 𝑑𝐵,𝑁  and 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 
we could not directly show which expression is larger. Thus we take a different approach in this proof. 
Instead of comparing the two expressions for a general s value, we first show that when 𝑠 = 0  𝑐𝐵,𝑁 <















𝛽𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1  
2
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 +
𝑁(1−𝛽) 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼2  
2
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2   (A27) 
=
𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝛽 3𝜃 2+𝑁2 𝛼0−𝛼1 
2−2𝑁𝜃  2𝛼0−𝛼1  +(1−𝛽) 3𝜃 
2+𝑁2 𝛼0−𝛼2 
2−2𝑁𝜃  2𝛼0−𝛼2   
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 =
𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐 
2




8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 





∗  with s=0 (the RHS of this equation is given in A22, and the LHS 
in A27) we find that social welfare under bundling is greater than under no service if and only if 𝑐 < 𝑑𝐵,𝑁, 
where  
𝑑𝐵,𝑁 = 𝜃 −
𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  3




     (A28) 
In addition, according to Proposition 1, when 𝑠 = 0 the c value at which the seller would start offering the 
bundle is : 
𝑐𝐵,𝑁 = 𝜃 −  𝜃 𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁.       (A29) 
Comparing the expressions for 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 and 𝑑𝐵,𝑁  when s=0 we get: 
𝑑𝐵,𝑁 − 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 =  𝜃 𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁 −
𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  3





=  𝜃 𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁  1 −  
3𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 




     (A30) 
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In addition, due to Assumption 1, according to which 𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁 > 0, we have : 
  𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁  3𝜃 + 𝛼0𝑁 + 𝑁
2 𝛽𝛼1
2 +  1 − 𝛽 𝛼2
2  − 3𝜃  𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁  
=  𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁  3𝜃 + 𝛼0𝑁 − 3𝜃  + 𝑁
2 𝛽𝛼1
2 +  1 − 𝛽 𝛼2
2 
= 𝑁  𝛼0 𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁 + 𝑁 𝛽𝛼1
2 +  1 − 𝛽 𝛼2
2  > 0 
As a result, 
3𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 




< 1 and 𝑑𝐵,𝑁 > 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 .  
Now, suppose 𝑠 > 0. We use the following notation:  
𝐹 𝑐, 𝑠 = 𝜋𝐵
∗ (𝑐, 𝑠) + 𝐶𝑆𝐵
∗(𝑐, 𝑠) − 𝜋𝑁
∗ − 𝐶𝑆𝑁
∗  and  
𝐺 𝑐, 𝑠 = 𝜋𝐵
∗ (𝑐, 𝑠) − 𝜋𝑁
∗ .  
Thus, 𝑑𝐵,𝑁  and 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 are the c values at which of 𝐹 𝑐, 𝑠 = 0 and 𝐺 𝑐, 𝑠 = 0, respectively. Then, by the 
Implicit Function Theorem, we have: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑠





       (A31) 
𝜕
𝜕𝑠





       (A32) 






𝑐𝐵,𝑁 , and since dB,N> cB,N when s=0 (shown above), this is also the case 
















= −  
𝛼0 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐𝐵 ,𝑁 
2 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
  
− 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐𝐵 ,𝑁 
2 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
  = 𝛼0 (A33) 
       
𝜕
𝜕𝑠





































































































        (A35) 
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Where the last equality above was derived using the fact that −𝜕𝜋𝐵
∗ /𝜕𝑠 = 𝛼0𝜕𝜋𝐵

















𝛽𝑁  𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼1  
2
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 +
1−𝛽𝑁𝜃+𝛼0𝑠−𝑐𝜃−𝑁𝛼0−𝛼2−2𝑠𝜃−𝛼0𝑁𝛼0−𝛼228𝜃𝜃−𝛼0𝑁2 = 
𝛽𝑁 𝑁𝛼0 𝛼0−𝛼1 −𝜃  𝛼0−2𝛼1    𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼1  
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 +
(1−𝛽)𝑁 𝑁𝛼0 𝛼0−𝛼2 −𝜃  𝛼0−2𝛼2    𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼2  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼2  
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 






𝛽𝑁 𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1    𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼1  
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 −
 
 1−𝛽 𝑁 𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼2    𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼2  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼2  
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2   










𝛽𝑁 𝑁𝛼0 𝛼0−𝛼1 −𝜃  𝛼0−2𝛼1 −𝛼0 𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1     𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼1  
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 +
(1−𝛽)𝑁 𝑁𝛼0 𝛼0−𝛼2 −𝜃  𝛼0−2𝛼2 −𝛼0 𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼2     𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼2  −2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  𝛼0−𝛼2  
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2  
=
−𝑁𝜃  𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐 
2𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
 𝛽 𝛼0 − 𝛼1 +  1 − 𝛽  𝛼0 − 𝛼2  + 
𝑁 𝑁 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐 +2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  
2𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
 𝛽 𝛼0 − 𝛼1 
2 +  1 − 𝛽  𝛼0 − 𝛼2 
2   
=
𝑁 𝑁 𝜃 +𝛼0𝑠−𝑐 +2𝑠 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁  
2𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
(𝛽 𝛼0 − 𝛼1 
2 +  1 − 𝛽  𝛼0 − 𝛼2 
2)   (A36) 
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Equation A(36) evaluated at 𝑐 = 𝑑𝐵,𝑁  is positive because 𝑑𝐵,𝑁  cannot be greater than 𝜃 + 𝛼0𝑠  (the 
equilibrium bundle demand becomes zero at 𝑐 = 𝜃 + 𝛼0𝑠). Thus, given Assumption 1, the numerator of 








< 0, because total social 
























> 0  
indicating that 𝑑𝐵,𝑁  increases faster than 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 in s. Thus, we conclude that 𝑑𝐵,𝑁 > 𝑐𝐵,𝑁  when 𝑠 ≥ 0. 
When s <s0, the monopoly chooses only between bundling and not selling the service and thus, for c 
values such that 𝑐𝐵,𝑁 < 𝑐 < 𝑑𝐵,𝑁, he will not sell the service while social welfare would be higher if  a 
bundle was offered 
The proof of part (ii) follows a similar procedure and can be obtained from the authors. 
Proof of Lemma 1 
(i). When 𝑠 = 0, 
 𝜋𝐵 =
𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
4 𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
 
 𝐶𝑆𝐵 =
𝛽𝑁  𝜃 −𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼1   
2
+𝑁(1−𝛽)  𝜃 −𝑐  𝜃 −𝑁 𝛼0−𝛼2   
2
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 =
𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝜃 2+𝛽𝑁2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 






𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐 






𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐  𝜃 2+𝛽𝑁2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 









𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐  −𝜃 2+2𝛼0𝑁𝜃 +𝛽𝑁
2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 =
𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐  𝜃  2𝛼0𝑁−𝜃  +𝛽𝑁
2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2  
The above is positive if 𝜃 < 2𝛼0𝑁 and 𝜃 > 𝑐 (these are sufficient , but not necessary conditions).  
It should be noted that when s =0, if 𝜃 < 𝑐 the seller would not sell a bundle anyway.  
(ii). Suppose that all αj increase by same incremental amount, ε. After the increase, α0 (the average 
marginal network valuations) becomes 𝛼0 + 𝜀. Denote the consumer surplus and the monopoly profit 
after the increase by 𝐶𝑆𝐵
′  and 𝜋𝐵
′ . What we show here is that 
 






















𝑁2 𝜃 − 𝑐 2
4 𝜃 − 𝛼0𝑁 
2
 









𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝜃 2+𝛽𝑁2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
2 −
𝑁 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝜃 2+𝛽𝑁2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝑁(𝛼0+𝜀) 






𝑁2 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝜃 2+𝛽𝑁2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
3   









𝑁3 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝛼0𝜃 +𝛽𝑁
2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 
4𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
3 > 0 . 





𝜃  𝜃 −𝑐 
2






 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝜃 3+𝛼0𝑁𝜃 
2−3𝛽𝑁2𝜃  1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2+𝛼0𝛽𝑁
3 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 









 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 −𝜃 3+3𝛼0𝑁𝜃 
2+3𝛽𝑁2𝜃  1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2−𝛼0𝛽𝑁
3 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
3  
=
 𝜃 −𝑐 
2
 𝛼0𝛽𝑁
2 1−𝛽  𝛼1−𝛼2 
2 3𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 +𝜃  3𝛼0𝑁−𝜃   
8𝜃  𝜃 −𝛼0𝑁 
3   
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Appendix  2. Three Extensions 
In this Appendix we discuss some of the assumptions from our model and show that the results are 
generally robust to changes in those assumptions.  
1.  The Number of Groups 
In the model presented in Section 3 we assumed that there are only two possible consumer types in 
respect to service and network valuations. However, the results presented in this paper still hold for the 
more general case in which consumers are categorized into m groups according to their service valuations.  
In the generalized model, consumers from Group i (i= 1, 2, … ,m) have marginal service and  
network valuation αi , and, without loss of generality, we assume 𝛼𝑖 > 𝛼𝑖+1 > 0 for  i= 1,…, m-1. In 
addition, the proportion of Group i of the entire population is βi (where βi≥0  and   𝛽𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 = 1) . 
As in the case of two groups, it can be shown that the profit from selling the bundle is concave in the 
bundle price pB.  As the bundle price increases, demand from each group decreases, and gradually demand 
from groups with lower service valuations may become zero. The maximum profit is achieved at some 
value of pB such that consumers from kB groups buy the bundle (i.e., there is positive demand from groups 
i=1 to kB and zero demand from groups i=kB+1, ..,m.) It can be shown that if the profit is maximized when 
demand from groups i=1 to kB is positive and not all consumers from Group 1 buy the bundle (the 









             (B1) 
and the resulting profit is given by: 
   𝜋𝐵
∗ =
𝑁 𝛽0




𝑘𝐵   𝜃 −𝛼0
𝑘𝐵 𝑁 
                (B2) 
where   𝛼0
𝑘 =  𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ,  and   𝛽0
𝑘 =  𝛽𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1   . 
The profit from selling the service separately is concave in the service price f and in the product price 
pS. Holding the product price fixed, as f increases demand for the service from each group decreases, and 
gradually the service demand from groups with low service valuations becomes zero. Holding the service 
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fee fixed, as ps increases demand from groups that buy only the product decreases, as well as demand 
from groups that buy both the service and the product. The maximum profit is achieved at prices ps and  f 
such that kS groups buy the service (i.e., customers from groups i=1 to kS buy the service, while customers 
from groups i=kS+1, .. ,m  buy only the product).  Finally, it can be shown that when the profit from 
selling the service separately is maximized at prices such that only kS groups buy the service, customers 
from group ks have strictly larger utility from buying the service than from not buying it, and there are 
some consumers from Group 1 that do not buy the product and the service (the equivalent of Assumption 











 ,     (B3) 














.          (B4)  
Notice that if ks= kB =m, then the two strategies become equivalent. If ks= kB <m, then selling the 
service separately dominates selling the bundle. Thus for m=2 we needed to compare only the profit from 
selling a bundle at a price such that consumers from both groups buy it (i.e., kB=2) to the profit from 
selling the service separately at a price such that only consumers from Group 1 buy it (ks=1). The profit 
from selling a bundle at a price such that only consumers from Group 1 would buy it was dominated by 
the profit from selling the service separately.  
Deriving analytically the optimal strategy for each set of parameters values (a generalized version of 
Lemma 1) becomes significantly more complex as it would depend on the specific values of kb and ks 
which also depend on the parameters values. However, for each set of parameters‟ values it is easy to 
numerically determine which strategy maximizes the seller‟s profit. In addition, we can show numerically 
cases of under provision of the service when m>2.   
For simplicity of the model and the presentation of the results, we keep m = 2 throughout the paper. It 
is important to note though that our results do not depend on the assumption that m = 2, and under 
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provision of the service as described in Sections 4 and 5 occurs even with m >2. In fact, there are more 
possible types of under provision as m increases. For example, it can be that the monopoly chooses to sell 
the service separately at a price so that only customers from Groups 1 and 2 buy it, but it is socially 
optimal to sell the service separately at a price such that customers from Groups 1, 2 and 3 buy it.   
As in the case of m = 2, searching a large space of parameters values we did not find any numerical 
examples of over provision of the service. 
2.  Linear Network Effects 
In the model presented in this paper, we follow the common modeling approach according to which the 
value of the network to a user is linearly increasing in the number of network users (e.g., Katz and 
Shapiro 1986 and 1992, Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, Jing  2007).  However, in some cases it might be 
argued that the value of the network to a user is a concave function of the number of users. That is, the 
marginal value derived from each additional service-user is decreasing.   
When service valuations are a concave function of the size of the network, intuition predicts that there 
would be less incentive for the monopoly to offer the service and in addition the service might be less 
socially desirable (compared to the linear valuations case).  However, we still expect to see under 
provision of the service, because, as with linear network effects, the value generated to consumers in the 
presence of network effects cannot be fully captured by the monopoly.  
When the benefits of the network are a concave function of the number of users, the utility a user 
from Group i derives from buying a bundle at price pB is given by  
𝑢 = 𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖 𝑠 + 𝑛𝑠
𝜌
 − 𝑝𝐵 ,                                                    (B5) 
and the utility the user derives from buying the product and the service separately is given by 
𝑢 = 𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖 𝑠 + 𝑛𝑠
𝜌
 − 𝑝𝑠 − 𝑓 ,           (B6) 
where  0 < 𝜌 < 1.  When 𝜌 = 1 we get the model presented in the previous sections, in which the utility 
is linear in the network size. When 𝜌 = 0, we have a service that does not display network effects.  
Unlike in the case of 𝜌 = 1, when the utility is a concave function of the network size it is impossible 
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to derive a closed form expression for the Fulfilled Expectations Equilibrium demand as a function of 
price(s). Thus it is also impossible to derive closed form expressions for the optimal price or the seller‟s 
profit.  However, the monopolist‟s profit at different given prices and from different strategies, and thus 
the monopolist‟s optimal strategy, can be found numerically for each set of parameter values. 
Figure 8 provides a numerical example that demonstrates the optimal strategy and the strategy that 
maximizes social welfare when there are two groups of consumers and service valuations are a concave 
function of the network size (specifically, 𝜌 = 0.5). From Figure B1 we see that the results are very 
similar to those derived when the valuations are linearly increasing in the network size. Specifically, as 
the marginal cost of providing the service decreases, the optimal monopoly‟s strategy changes from not 
selling the service, to selling it separately to bundling it with the product. We also see that, as in the case 
of linear network valuations, there is a range of c values where the service is under provided. Specifically, 
when 14< c <16 the monopoly sells the service separately while offering a bundle would maximize social 
welfare, and when 44< c <45 the monopoly does not offer the service, while selling it separately would 
maximize social welfare. 
  
Figure B1. Under provision of the service when service valuations are a concave 
function of the network size 
Holding all parameter values as in the numerical example displayed in Figure B1, but setting 𝜌 =1 (so 
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that network valuations are linearly increasing in the network size) we find that the monopoly sells a 
bundle for c < 45.24, offers the service separately for 45.24 < c < 63.89 and does not sell the service 
otherwise. In addition, when c < 59.87 social welfare is maximized by a bundle, and when 59.87< c < 
70.18 social welfare is maximized when service is sold separately. Thus, as predicted, everything else 
being equal, when valuations are a concave function of the size of the network, the service is less likely to 
be offered (i.e., it is offered at a smaller range of c values), and in addition is less likely to be socially 
desirable. Thus, the range of parameter values for which under provision would be observed is smaller. 
Finally, even though it is impossible to derive closed form expressions for the equilibrium network 
size, the optimal bundle price and the resulting profit, the following proposition demonstrates the 
existence of under-provision of the service when consumer utility is a concave function of the network 
size, and consumers have homogenous network valuations. Specifically, it shows that there is always a 
range of c values for which the service would be under provided. 
Proposition 3. When network valuations are given by a concave function of network size and 
consumers have homogenous network valuations, there exists a none-empty range of marginal costs in 
which service is under provided. 
The Proof can be obtained from the authors. 
3.  Independency between Product and Service Valuations.  
In the model presented in Section 3, a consumer‟s product valuation and service valuation are 
independent of each other. This is a reasonable assumption for cases in which the product and service 
differ in nature and in use (for example, in the case of the Webkinz plush toy and the related Webkinz 
World website). However, in other cases it might be reasonable to assume that product and service 
valuations are positively correlated.  
If consumers who value the product highly also value the service highly, and consumers with low 
product valuation also have low service valuation, then it is likely that selling a bundle would become less 
profitable, because now the seller has to set a lower bundle price to attract consumers with low service 
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valuations (as most of them would also have low product valuations), or forgo sells to such consumers all 
together.   Another important point to notice is that with positive correlation between product and service 
valuations we have fewer consumers with high product valuation but low service valuation. That is, there 
are less consumers who would buy a bundle but will not buy the service when it is sold separately.   Thus 
when service and product valuations are positively correlated, we expect the seller to sell the service 
separately for a larger range of parameter values than when valuations are independent  
To validate these predictions, we consider the following modification of our model. We assume that 
the valuation for the product, θ, is uniformly distributed on [0, 𝜃]. In addition, as before, a consumer‟s 
valuation for the service is given by α(s+ns), however, here we assume that a consumer with product 
valuation θ, has high marginal valuation for the service, i.e., α = α1, with probability θ/𝜃 and low marginal 
valuation, α =α2, otherwise. Clearly, in this model product and service valuations are positively correlated 
(for example, a consumer with the highest product valuation will always have a high service valuation, 
and a consumer who does not value the product, would have low service valuation with certainty.) 
Though this latter model cannot be solved analytically, for any set of parameters values we can 
numerically find: 1) the seller‟s optimal bundle price and the resulting profit and consumer surplus, and 2) 
the optimal product and service prices, when service is sold separately, and the resulting profit and 
consumer surplus.  Figure B2 presents the profit and the social welfare for these two strategies, which 
were found numerically, as well as profit and the social welfare from selling only the product, as 
functions of the marginal cost, c. Figure B3 presents the monopolist‟s profit and the social welfare for the 
same parameters values as in Figure B2, but when product and service valuations are independent.  
Comparing the two figures we see that, as predicted, when valuations are correlated, selling the 
service separately would become more profitable then selling a bundle for a larger range of parameters 
values.  We also learn from this numerical example that with positive correlation, selling the service 
separately might dominate not offering the service for a larger range of parameters values.  In addition, 
the profit from selling the bundle is lower in the case of positive correlation.  
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Finally, as is evident from Figure B2, even with positive correlation the service is often under 
provided. Specifically, the seller might choose to sell the service separately when social welfare is 
maximized by a bundle, or not offer the service while social welfare is maximized when service is sold 
separately.  In fact, the first type of under provision is even more likely to prevail when valuations are 
positively correlated. We can provide many additional numerical examples that demonstrate the same 
results.  
 
Figure B2. The seller’s profit maximizing strategy and the strategy that maximizes 
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Figure B3. The seller’s profit maximizing strategy and the strategy that maximizes 
social welfare when product and service valuations are independent 
 
 
 
